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1 Introduction 
1.1 The JCOERE Project 
The Preventive Restructuring Directive1 passed in June 2019 has introduced a number of concepts that 
are new and untested throughout much of the EU. While the concepts themselves are not unfamiliar, 
due to their well-known usage in the American Chapter 11 procedure and in other pre-existing 
frameworks in a number of Member States,2 many of the new provisions included in the PRD have 
created a field of controversy and debate among academics, practitioners, and policy makers as 
legislators begin to work toward implementation by 17 July 2021.3 The PRD has created fertile ground 
for these debates, given that there are so many alternatives available within the legislative framework. 
Consequently, implementing legislation may generate different variations on the approach to corporate 
rescue and is not expected to yield a harmonised European preventive restructuring culture. These 
differences may also create difficulties in the coordination of cross-border preventive restructuring 
procedures by creating potential obstacles to court-to-court cooperation of both a substantive and 
procedural nature. It is in this issue of cooperation, (enhanced under the EIR Recast) which has been 
the focus of the JCOERE Project.4  
The JCOERE Project has researched the question as to whether the enhanced obligations imposed on 
courts and practitioners to co-operate in the EIR Recast5 will be particularly difficult in the context of 
 
* Professor Irene Lynch Fannon (BCL(NUI) BCL(Oxon) SJD(UVa) is the Principle Investigator on the JCOERE Project (see n 4) and a 
Professor of Corporate and Insolvency Law at the School of Law, University College Cork, Ireland. 
** Dr Jennifer L L Gant (BA MBA LLB(Hons) LLM Phd) is the post-doctoral researcher on the JCOERE Project (see n 4) at the School of 
Law, University College Cork, Ireland.  
1 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on 
discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge of debt, and the amending of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on restructuring and insolvency) [2019] OJ L 172/18 (the ‘PRD’). 
2 See for example the Irish Examinership process in Part 10 of the Companies Act 2014 and the French procédure de sauvegarde regulated by 
Articles L620-1 to L628-10 of the Commercial Code. 
3 PRD, art 37(1). 
4 The Judicial Cooperation in the EU Supporting Economic Recovery in Europe (JCOERE) Project (No. 800807) is funded by the European 
Union’s Justice Programme (2014-2020). For more information about the calls and proposals in the Justice funds, see the following website: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/programmes/just>. The content of this chapter represents the views of 
the authors only and is their sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the 
information it contains. See <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/> for more information about JCOERE. 
5 Council Regulation (EU) 848/2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (Recast) 
[2015] OJ L 141/19 (the ‘EIR Recast’) art 84; the cooperation obligations are contained in arts 41 (insolvency practitioners), 42 (courts), 43 




the introduction of robust preventive restructuring mechanisms derived from the PRD. Within a ‘big 
picture’ context, the question of cooperation is inextricably linked to the need for mutual trust among 
jurisdictions and judiciaries, which the European institutions have acknowledged is closely connected 
to the effectiveness (or not) of European integration generally. Thus, while this Project has focused on 
what appears to be a narrow area of law in the cross over between the PRD and the EIR Recast in terms 
of court-to-court cooperation, it interfaces with the some of the fundamental principles necessary to the 
success of the European project. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a snapshot of some of the 
Project findings to date with a particular focus on a pre-existing robust restructuring process, namely 
the Irish Examinership procedure,6 which, like the PRD is based (to some extent) on Chapter 11 of the 
US Bankruptcy Code. 
This Chapter will begin with a snapshot of the JCOERE Project teasing out some implications connected 
to the Preventive Restructuring Directive and the cooperation obligations under the EIR Recast against 
the backdrop of emerging European debates. It will go on to consider how the PRD reflects a range of 
preventive restructuring processes that already exist in the EU with a particular focus on the Irish 
Examinership process. When one considers the interface between the PRD and the co-operation 
obligations in the EIR Recast it should be noted that not all of these processes will be covered by the 
EIR Recast. In Ireland, for example, there is one process that is specifically included in Annexe A of 
the EIR Recast (Examinership) and one that is not (Schemes of Arrangement),7 which is modelled 
exactly on the UK scheme of arrangement8 and which has been part of Irish law since at least 1948). 
The Chapter will continue with a focus on the Irish Examinership process and consider the substantive 
rules which are part of a robust restructuring framework in light of the 30 years of experience with 
Examinership in the Irish courts. It will consider these rules in light of significant cases by the Irish 
courts and this discussion will add to the theoretical debate currently being conducted in Member States 
regarding implementation of the PRD.  
1.2 The Challenges Identified: The JCOERE Reports 
Based on existing experience with restructuring (e.g. Ireland), the JCOERE Project identified particular 
substantive rules and procedural features often associated with preventive restructuring frameworks that 
have the potential to be particularly problematic in the context of the cooperation obligations under the 
EIR Recast.9 The JCOERE Report 110 included a comparative analysis of restructuring processes in 11 
selected Member States as measured against the PRD with a focus on a number of its specific provisions. 
Among those substantive rules identified in the PRD as being particularly problematic and included in 
the JCOERE Questionnaire11 were the thresholds required to enter into a preventive restructuring 
procedure (Article 1(1) and 2(2), the involvement of insolvency practitioners and courts (Article 5), the 
 
6 Enacted in Ireland in 1990 and contained in Chapter 10 of the Companies Act 2014. Modelled on the US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 this 
was probably enacted as part of Ireland’s Foreign Direct Investment Strategy sending a clear message to US multinational companies that 
Ireland’s legal system presented with similar features to that of the United States. 
7 See Irish Companies Act 2014 Part 10 for the Examinership provisions and Part 9 for the Scheme of Arrangement. 
8 See England & Wales Companies Act 2006 Part 26 for the UK Scheme of Arrangement.  
9 Relevant obligations included in Articles 42-44 and 56 and 57 of the Regulation. Note the language is mandatory. Article 42 states that the 
court ‘shall co-operate’… to the extent that such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings’… It also 
details the form of co-operation:- 
For that purpose, the courts may, where appropriate, appoint an independent person or body acting on its instructions, provided that it is 
not incompatible with the rules applicable to them.  
2.In implementing the cooperation set out in paragraph 1, the courts, or any appointed person or body acting on their behalf, as referred 
to in paragraph 1, may communicate directly with, or request information or assistance directly from, each other provided that such 
communication respects the procedural rights of the parties to the proceedings and the confidentiality of information.  
3. The cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 may be implemented by any means that the court considers appropriate. It may, in particular, 
concern: (a) coordination in the appointment of the insolvency practitioners; (b) communication of information by any means considered 
appropriate by the court; (c) coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor's assets and affairs; (d) coordination of the 
conduct of hearings; (e) coordination in the approval of protocols, where necessary.’ 
Article 43 applies the same obligation to insolvency practitioners to co-operate with courts ‘to the extent that such cooperation and 
communication are not incompatible with the rules applicable to each of the proceedings and do not entail any conflict of interest’. Similarly 
Article 56 applies the same set of obligations in a group context to insolvency practitioners and Article 57 applies a similar obligation to courts 
in a group context. 
10 Since the INSOL Europe Academic Forum Annual Meeting in Copenhagen in 2019, the JCOERE Project has progressed significantly 
through its research. JCOERE Report 1 was submitted to the European Commission in January 2020 and is now available on the JCOERE 
Website in full. The full Report 1 of the JCOERE Project is available to download from: <https://cora.ucc.ie/handle/10468/9810> or chapter 
by chapter basis from here: <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1chapter/>. 




stay (Article 6), plan adoption and majority rule in plan confirmation (Articles 9 and 10), the cross-class 
cram-down (Article 11), the protection of new and interim financing (Articles 17 and 18 ). These, along 
with a number of underlying policy and procedural questions, were posed to 11 jurisdictions, the 
responses of which were then incorporated into JCOERE Report 1 and converted into individual 
jurisdiction country reports.12  
The JCOERE Report 2, which was submitted to the European Commission in the summer of 2020, 
explored the nature, understanding, and awareness of the court to court cooperation obligations under 
the EIR Recast in the context of preventive restructuring, but focusing more squarely on more generally 
applicable procedural issues. At the time of writing, the findings indicate, in short, that cooperation is 
conceptually challenging if one considers the various competing principles and obligations attributable 
to a broad range of issues from legal culture, constitutional requirements, and the demands of insolvency 
practise. In reality formal requests for co-operation have not become a central issue among European 
insolvency judges or in courts. It is hypothesised that to some extent this is due to the relative newness 
of the cooperation obligations, which has led the research team to project potential issues drawn from 
earlier cases and suggest how cases under the EIR Recast may then be handled to ensure effective 
cooperation and coordination. These recommendations are underpinned by existing guidelines and 
recommendations in judicial cooperation and a survey of judicial focus groups exploring their views 
and experience.13  
These two Reports will be followed by a series of case studies focused on cooperation in insolvency 
and restructuring to be made available to the European judiciary in an online format.  
1.3 The Irish Restructuring Context 
The next section will introduce the Irish Examinership process and consider how the threshold 
provisions for accessing an Examinership function. Section 3 will discuss the confirmation by a majority 
vote of creditors (intra-class cram-down)14 along with the possibility of a cross-class cram-down, with 
an interrogation of the debate around absolute priority and relative priority,15 taking a pragmatic view 
within the context of the Irish experience about the practical implications of these rules. The Irish 
experience indicates that this debate requires clarification as to what is meant by either of these 
approaches and raises serious questions about the value of this debate and its outcomes in terms of ‘real 
life’ rescue. The assertion that a compromise on pre-existing priorities is part and parcel of any robust 
preventive restructuring framework will be illustrated by reference to significant Irish case law, 
including decisions of the Irish Supreme Court. The Irish courts’ treatment of rescue financing and its 
notional protection or priority in the form of counting as certified expenses of the examiner will also be 
discussed.16 The Chapter will be concluded by a discussion of some of the team’s findings in relation to 
the judicial experience of cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases in the EU as they relate 
specifically to the provisions under scrutiny in the context of the Irish Examinership. 
2 Irish Examinership: A Robust Restructuring Procedure 
2.1 The Examinership Process  
The Examinership process contains many (arguably all) of the features included in the PRD with 
(according to a taxonomy developed by JCOERE to distinguish different kinds of restructuring 
processes in a comparative context) a ‘robust’ approach to rescue. It was introduced in 1990 and was 
modelled largely on the Chapter 11 restructuring procedure of the United States Bankruptcy Code. It 
was part of a series of measures updating and modernising the entire landscape of company law in 
Ireland in the 1990s. It appears that this was part of an increasingly successful foreign direct investment 
strategy instituted by successive Irish governments aimed in particular at attracting investment from the 
 
12 The contributing jurisdictions included Ireland, Italy, Romania, France, The Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Spain, Austria, and 
the UK. The country reports are accessible here: <https://www.ucc.ie/en/jcoere/research/report1/report1jurisdiction/>.  
13 At the time of writing (July 2020) Report 2 has been submitted (in draft) and will be presented on the JCOERE Website over the summer of 
2020. Please follow on Twitter @JCOEREProject for up to date information and announcements. 
14 Companies Act 2014, s 540. 
15 Companies Act 2014, s 541. 




US. Although a committed member of the EU in terms of legal policy, particularly as regards financial 
and commercial law and practise, Ireland has always posed the question internally of itself whether it is 
closer to ‘Boston or Berlin’.17 
Examinership is a restructuring process that confers court protection on a company in financial 
difficulties, with a view to facilitating the successful restructuring of the company.18 This ‘court 
protection’ is essentially the same as the stay or moratorium,19 which is a key aspect of any insolvency 
or effective restructuring procedure, providing what is often termed a ‘breathing space’ during which 
the debtor can make arrangements and negotiate a plan or deal with creditors with a view to 
rehabilitating an ailing company. This is a key provision under the PRD, which provides for the 
imposition of a stay of individual enforcement actions for up to four months.20 The stay has been a 
central element of Irish restructuring for over thirty years. Once commenced, Examinership provides 
for a court mandated stay against enumerated enforcement actions, which will last for 70 days and which 
may be extended upon application to court for an additional 30 days.21 In European debates prior to the 
passing of the PRD, the stay is also, perhaps surprisingly to some who view the stay as integral, a 
potentially controversial provision given the impact it can have on the contractual rights of creditors. 
Arguably, however, a collective proceeding is functionally improbable, if not impossible, without the 
ability to exercise control over the enforcement activities of creditors.  
The restructuring under an Examinership procedure is guided by an examiner who is appointed by the 
court and is a recognised insolvency practitioner. He or she will lead the procedure, facilitating the 
rescue of the company. The company remains under court protection for the maximum period described 
above or some earlier date when the court approves or rejects the examiner’s report.22 The examiner’s 
report contains inter alia the list of creditors of the company and their priority, the proposals that were 
placed before the required meetings of creditors, and the outcome of each of the required meetings, in 
other words, whether that class of creditors voted in favour or against the plan.23 The plan will also 
contain the examiner’s recommendations as to how the company will continue trading and return to 
viability.24 Upon the court decision, the examinership is usually brought to an end, either because the 
restructuring plan has been approved or rejected by the court.25 The examinership restructuring process 
success is therefore contingent on the court approving the examiner’s plan.26    
The following two subsections will discuss issues arising around the threshold of insolvency and plan 
viability as well as the stay of enforcement actions as they have arisen within the 30 years of Irish 
jurisprudence of examinership cases. 
2.2 The Threshold Question 
There has been a great deal of debate revolving around the thresholds at which companies can and 
should be able to access insolvency and pre-insolvency (preventive restructuring) procedures. EU 
Member States have adopted a range of gatekeeping approaches in this area, from the restrictive 
approach with explicit debt percentages at which a company must file, to more subjective criteria 
making access to procedures more flexible to the point that there is no practical threshold to overcome. 
The more flexible procedures have been said to open the way for abuse as they could allow companies 
 
17 Jim Dunne, ‘Boston, or Berlin’ (The Irish Times 2001) <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/boston-or-berlin-1.314552> accessed 10 July 
2020: ‘That is why Mary Harney says the Republic should look more to Boston than to Berlin. Low tax stimulates growth just as high tax (as 
France and Germany amply demonstrate), leads to low growth and high unemployment. Some business figures here privately fear that the 
apparatchiks in the European Commission - predominantly left-wing or, as they prefer to say, social democratic - would ram Continental 
European economic policies down Irish throats post-Nice. McCreevy sees the danger and so does Harney. And so, it would appear, does the 
Attorney General.’  
18 Court protection is another way of saying a stay against individual enforcement actions.  
19 Companies Act 2014, s 520. 
20 PRD, art 6. 
21 Companies Act 2014, s 520, 534 New measures currently being considered will allow for an extension of this period in the context of COVID 
19. See www.clrg.org. 
22 The legislation also provides for an independent report provided to the court at the outset which will describe the affairs of the company 
from a perspective which is independent of the drive towards rescue.Companies Act 2014, s. 511 
23 Companies Act 2014, ss 536(f)(a)(c) respectively.  
24 Companies Act 2014, s 536(h).  
25 The court may also accept the plan subject to modifications being made; Irish Companies Act 2014 s 541(3)(b).  
26 See Aoife Finnerty, ‘Preventive Restructuring - Is Ireland a Leader in the EU?’ in Jennifer L L Gant (ed), Harmonisation of Insolvency and 




to escape debt obligations by simply filing under the relevant procedure and subsequently holding 
creditors hostage to a procedural cram-down. The debate continues to rage on the moral hazard of 
flexible procedures;27 thus, the threshold question is an important and sometimes divisive factor to 
consider, particularly as this definition is wholly up to the national law of Member States. 
There are 2 threshold tests of sorts under the PRD: the threshold of insolvency which is defined as a 
‘likelihood of insolvency’ by reference to Member State parameters, and the option of a viability test 
when it comes to approving a plan. The Examinership procedure covers both functional insolvency and 
situations where there is a likelihood of insolvency, specifying the availability of the procedure when a 
company is ‘unable to pay its debts’ or ‘likely to be unable to pay its debts’.28 In addition there must be 
no order or resolution for winding up.29 No order to appoint an examiner can be made where a a receiver 
has been appointed for three days.30 Finally, there must be a ‘reasonable prospect for the survival of the 
company.’31 The appointment of an examiner to related companies in a group structure is addressed in 
detail in the legislation.32 The threshold question in Irish law reflects the option of introducing a 
‘viability test’ under the PRD, ‘provided that such a test has the purpose of excluding debtors that do 
not have a prospect of viability, and that it can be carried out without detriment to the debtors’ assets.’33 
Whereas Ireland includes this additional viability test as a matter of course, the PRD makes this fully 
optional in terms of the implementation of preventive restructuring frameworks among the Member 
States.  
The PRD also envisages a relaxation of court involvement where it is necessary and proportionate to do 
so while ‘ensuring that rights of any affected parties and relevant stakeholders are safeguarded.’34 There 
is also the potential for more than one procedure with varying levels of authoritative involvement, as 
well as considering the use of an administrative authority in the alternative to a court.35 Ireland does 
have informal restructuring processes within this context. However, the Examinership takes place with 
obligatory court involvement. The court is the arbiter of the threshold questions. The question remains 
as to whether there may be preventive restructuring processes introduced under the PRD without court 
involvement. If so, the adoption of a radical restructuring process may be problematic without some 
kind of supervision. On the other hand, court involvement is viewed as adding considerably to the cost 
of the process. Amongst other problems, the cost makes it unattractive to certain kinds of companies, 
such as those that are small and medium sized (SMEs). The importance of court decisions on the 
threshold question is illustrated by the two cases discussed below. Given the radical outcomes of a 
robust restructuring process, this may be problematic in terms of court to court co-operation.36 This 
observation is applicable across the questions of imposing a stay, implementing intra- and cross-class 
cram-down,37 and operation of either an absolute or relative priority rule. 
2.3 Insolvency Threshold Test Utilised in a Preventive Restructuring Procedure 
There are generally 2 different tests that can be applied to determine functional insolvency in order for 
a company to access a collective procedure: the cash flow and balance sheet tests.38 While the same 
 
27 This debate formed part of a panel discussion held by Reinhard Dammann, Christoph Paulus, and Francisco Garcimartin during the ‘Directive 
on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks: Relative or Absolute Cramdown’ session at the INSOL Europe Annual Congress on 27th September 
2019, Copenhagen, Denmark; see also for example Stephan Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows of US Insolvency Law: A Proposal to Divide the 
Realms of Insolvency and Restructuring Law’ (2018) 19 Eur Bus L Rev 615; Vasile Rotaru, ‘The Restructuring Directive: a Functional Law 
and Economics Analysis from a French Law Perspective’ (2019) Working Paper published by Droit et Croissance 15; Nicolaes Tollenaar, Pre-
Insolvency Proceedings: A Normative Foundation and Framework (OUP 2019) which argue various aspects of the benefits or hazards of 
flexible preventive restructuring procedures, including a loose threshold at which procedures can be accessed.  
28 Companies Act 2104, s 509 (1) (a). 
29 Companies Act 2014, s 509 (1) (b) and (c). 
30 Companies Act 2014, s 512(4) 
31 Companies Act 2014, s 509(2)  
32 References to related companies and groups are made in ss 517 ff. 
33 PRD, art 4(3). 
34 PRD, art 4(6) 
35 PRD, art 4(5). 
36 In the EIR Recast, Article 2(6) states that court is defined as follows: 
… (i) in points (b) and (c) of art 1(1), art 4(2), arts 5 and 6, art 21(3), point (j) of art 24(2), arts 36 and 39, and arts 61 to 77, the judicial body 
of a Member State; (ii) in all other Articles, the judicial body or any other competent body of a Member State empowered to open insolvency 
proceedings, to confirm such opening or to take decisions in the course of such proceedings. 
37 It should be noted, however, that Article 11 of the PRD requires court or administrative authority approval of a compromise entailing a 
cross-class cram-down. 




applies to a number of existing preventive restructuring procedures, the PRD sets the ‘likelihood of 
insolvency’ as the threshold at which preventive restructuring procedures should be available,39 which 
is defined by reference to Member State law40 and may result in procedures in different jurisdictions 
that can be used at a diverse number of points along the stream of financial distress.41 Article 4 of the 
PRD provides the rules around at what point in the ‘stream’ of financial distress a company may be able 
to avail of preventive restructuring frameworks devised under the PRD. While there is no definition in 
the PRD, ‘a likelihood of insolvency’42 is generally understood as being at some point prior to functional 
insolvency under the jurisdictional definitions in each Member State, though there are arguments that 
pre-insolvency is still insolvency, adding commentative confusion to the debate.43  
The Irish experience in relation to the threshold at which a restructuring procedure is available has 
shown that the involvement of the court on the question of threshold to be of vital importance. The issue 
of whether a stay should be granted and the prospect of rescue pursued is not confined to technical 
questions of solvency. The considerable litigation surrounding the appointment of an examiner in Kitty 
Hall44 is demonstrative of this point. Ultimately, the appointment came down to a specific question as 
to whether the preventive restructuring process ought to be or could be available even when the debtor 
had already entered into a binding restructuring agreement with its single most significant creditor, 
Deutsche Bank, which was owed 650 million euro. The application to appoint an examiner was refused 
in the High Court. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed to appoint an examiner and a 
restructuring was also ultimately approved by the High Court. 
2.4 Restructuring Plan Viability Test 
Judicial discretion is often a key factor when applying the viability test under Irish law, an optional test 
under the PRD. This discretion was exercised by the courts in Vantive Holdings in relation to whether 
a rescue was viable under the Examinership process. In Vantive Holdings45 there were a series of 
decisions, the main issue of which concerned the question as to whether there was any real viability in 
the rescue proposals. Vantive Holdings was the holding company for a large construction group, Zoe 
Developments, which benefitted from a huge growth in profits during the booming Celtic Tiger years.46 
Following the financial crash, the collapse of the property market in Ireland and the collapse of the main 
Irish banks, Vantive Holdings attempted to avail of the Irish Examinership process when it faced a debt 
total of €1.3 billion. The independent accountant assessing the viability of the rescue plan based its 
recommendations upon an expected surplus of €10 million predicated on the recovery of the Irish 
property market. The threshold question was a significant touchstone. The optimism of the accountant 
assessing the plan did not persuade the court. Rather in the refusal of the application for examinership, 
Kelly P. remarked that ‘[the] degree of optimism on the part of the independent accountant borders, if 
it does not actually trespass, upon the fanciful.’ Kelly P. went on to observe:  
I have the gravest reservations about the projections on which the independent accountant has 
relied in forming his opinion. They appear to me to be lacking in reality given the extraordinary 
collapse that has occurred and the lack of any indication of the revival of fortunes in the property 
market. The valuations in question are out of date and can hardly be described as truly 
 
39 PRD, art 1(1)(a).  
40 PRD, art 2(2)(b). 
41 See the JCOERE Consortium, Judicial Co-Operation Supporting Economic Recovery in Europe (JCOERE) Report 1: Identifying substantive 
and Procedural rules in preventive restructuring frameworks including the Preventive Restructuring Directive which may be incompatible with 
judicial co-operation obligations (CORA 2020) < 
https://cora.ucc.ie/bitstream/handle/10468/9810/JCOERE_Report_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed 10 July 2020 (hereafter 
referred to as JCOERE Report 1) 140. Chapter 8 of the JCOERE Report 1 can also be accessed online here: 
<https://www.ucc.ie/en/media/projectsandcentres/jcoereproject/bannerimages/Chapter8ProceduralaspectsofPreventiveRestructuring_FINAL.
pdf>. 
42 PRD, art 4(1). 
43 See for example Tollenaar (n 27) although this author tends to be the voice of a minority devil’s advocate in this position. See also Rotaru 
(n 27). 
44 Re Kitty Hall Ltd and Ors and the Companies Acts [2017] IECA 247. 
45 Vantive Holdings Ltd v Companies Acts [2009] IEHC 384. 
46 ‘Celtic Tiger’ refers to Ireland’s economy from the mid-1990s to the late-2000s, a period of real and rapid economic growth fuelled by 
foreign direct investment. See Investopedia.com <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/celtictiger.asp> accessed 28 July 2020. Later on this 





independent. I am not satisfied that the petitioners have discharged the onus of proof of showing 
that there is a reasonable prospect of the survival of the companies.47 
The application was refused and on appeal this was confirmed.48 The Irish experience with regard to the 
application of a combination of threshold tests including questions of insolvency or likelihood of 
insolvency, a viability test and an area of judicial discretion exercised in this context demonstrates that 
this interpretative discretion is actually central to the functioning of the Examinership procedure. 
Admittedly, judges in Ireland who hear insolvency and restructuring cases have a long experience 
exercising judicial discretion in the performance of their decision-making, which may well differ from 
the courts and judges of other Member States.  
3 Creditors’ Rights in a Restructuring Process 
3.1 Introduction 
The PRD provides a variety of provisions that are felt to be common across effective restructuring 
procedures (the Examinership and Chapter 11, and in some areas the English scheme of arrangement 
and French sauvegarde, for example) but can also be contentious in terms of the impact they may have 
on creditor contractual entitlements as well as perceived issues of fairness and potential moral hazard. 
The PRD tries to allay fairness issues by introducing tests to apply under circumstances in which a 
whole class of creditors is bound to a plan due to a majority of other voting classes approving it (a cross-
class cram-down). However, the PRD offers a menu of choices to ensure fairness, which has introduced 
uncertainty in implementation and conflict among academics, practitioners, and national policy makers 
in terms of what test is the right test for a particular jurisdiction’s legal cultural circumstances. These 
tests are included in Article 11 of the PRD and include an ‘absolute priority rule’ (art 11(2), a European 
style ‘relative priority rule’ (art 11(1)(b), and the application of an ‘unfair prejudice test’ (art 11(2) 2nd 
para). The first two of these tests have led to considerable debate among insolvency academics in 
particular, while the pragmatic approach exemplified by the Irish experience (and the US experience) 
indicates that the distinction between the two tests is not so clear as the debate seems at times to presume.  
3.2 Negotiating Creditors’ Rights: The Absolute v Relative Priority Rule Debate49 
While the term ‘absolute priority’ seems to have an accepted definition derived from American 
restructuring law, in practice this is viewed only as a starting point, which can be diverted from if the 
outcome would be better for the collective of creditors.50 This is a similar approach to what is taken in 
the Irish Examinership as this default position is a starting point from which the restructuring process 
takes place. A restructuring plan will be adopted by the court if it complies with the conditions set out 
in the legislation.51 In the European context, Mennens states that: ‘The 2016 proposal contained an 
“absolute priority rule” (APR), which is similar to its US counterpart. This rule essentially requires that 
a dissenting class of creditors is paid in full before any value can be distributed to a lower ranking class. 
The APR ensures that priority is respected.’52 
The European concept of the RPR reflects pre-existing practise in some Member States. In Ireland, for 
example, Examinership provides for a cross-class cram-down. The outcome of many successful 
Examinerships reflects a flexible approach to consensual negotiations in the interests of producing a 
plan that will preserve value, investment, and employment. As with the US Chapter 11, the starting 
 
47 Vantive Holdings, per Kelly P in relation to the ‘Independent Accountant’s Report’. 
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50 Ignacio Tirado, ‘Relative vs Absolute Priority’ Keynote Address, INSOL Europe Academic Forum, 26 th September 2019, Copenhagen 
Denmark. 
51 See Irish Companies Act 2014 ss 534-543 for the conditions under which a plan will be confirmed and adopted. For a description of the 
operation of this procedure in Ireland, see generally Irene Lynch Fannon & G Murphy, Corporate Insolvency and Rescue (Bloomsbury 2012) 
chapters 12 and 13. 
52 Anne Mennens, ‘Puzzling Priorities: Harmonisation of European Preventive Restructuring Frameworks’ (Oxford Business Law Blog March 
25th, 2019) <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/03/puzzling-priorities-harmonisation-european-preventive-




point is an absolute priority rule pre-existing the examinership process. Negotiating the rescue plan and 
reaching what is generally called a ‘scheme of arrangement’ is done with full recognition and 
management of pre-insolvency entitlements. Any settlement or scheme must be approved by the court 
before it is effective. This stage (as is similarly envisaged in Article 11 of the PRD) allows for a 
consideration of all objections from dissenting creditors measured against what is in fact a ‘best interests 
of the creditors’ test,’ and an ‘unfair prejudice test’, which is defined in the Directive.53  
The introduction of the European version of the RPR reflects the diverging objectives pursued by the 
many contributors to the drafting of the PRD. Its introduction caused considerable consternation in some 
quarters, claiming that it will lead to arbitrary results and value destroying uncertainty.54 These 
criticisms have been roundly rebuffed by the authors of two reports55 along with a number of other 
respected commentators in the field. On the one hand, if the aim is to create proceedings that better 
safeguard the interests of all stakeholders who must together negotiate a plan in an optimal setting for 
such negotiation, then an RPR in the way it is drafted in the PRD seems understandable. On the other 
hand, it has been viewed as blurring the initial bargaining positions of creditors. The argument continues 
that the existence of an RPR approach broadens the scope of agreements beyond what can reasonably 
be discussed under time pressures as each creditor has an incentive to try and win a bit more from the 
agreement as the priority rules become a subject for negotiation.56 Thus, there remains challenging 
issues of perspective and even terminology that mean this debate continues to rage during the 
implementation period of the PRD. As such, an examination of the American context, from which the 
test is derived, is instructive.57 
3.3 The United States and Absolute Priority 
It seems there is some transatlantic misunderstanding as to whether US Chapter 11 does indeed have an 
APR rule. In both Chapter 11 and variations of it such as the Irish Examinership process the absolute 
priority rule applies as a starting point from which creditor agreements and compromises begin. 
Similarly, the APR applies as a default floor from which the question of ‘unfair prejudice’ or the test as 
to the creditors’ best interest applies. It has been said that the US Chapter 11 procedure has an APR 
rule, but it is observed more in the breach of that rule than in an strict compliance with it. Despite the 
debate in some European quarters it is not possible to have rescue without a departure from the APR. 
Quite simply it does not make sense that this would or even could be the case should complex negotiated 
restructurings be realistically achievable. As noted by Lubben: 
[T]here is no absolute priority rule of the kind described in the literature under current law. It is 
not clear there ever has been such a rule…[a]nd even if there were, adopting such a rule would 
be inconsistent with chapter 11, or any other sensible system of reorganization. That is, chapter 
11 will not work under the kind of rigid absolute priority rule many academic commentators 
promote, and thus the rule would be certainly flouted. 58 
Lubben’s observations are reflected in the assertion in this paper that a compromise on pre-existing 
priorities is part and parcel of any robust preventive restructuring framework. This is reflected in Irish 
case law.  
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It is not clear whether the use of the term ‘absolute priority’ or ‘APR’ is understood in the same way 
across the board. Assuming that all domestic frameworks have a system of priorities that are applied in 
post insolvency distributive systems (liquidations for example), the issue is to what extent domestic 
preventive restructuring frameworks as they exist move from accepted creditor priority ground rules to 
facilitate rescue. As Garciamartin observes, the APR is ‘the shadow under which the compromise is 
made.’59 For example, the Irish system specifically addresses receivership (based on significant rights 
in rem holdings) as is best illustrated by decisions such as Re Holidair,60 in which departure from the 
agreed status quo is facilitated by the legislative framework. This case illustrates how, even at the outset, 
secured creditors with significant agreed priorities can be affected by a robust rescue process. 
In Holidair, (which was the holding company of a specialised construction group called MF Kentz) 
Allied Irish Banks (AIB) had appointed a receiver subsequent to a pre-existing loan agreement and by 
implementation of what is called a deed of appointment. The appointment of a receiver in this context 
is associated with the right in rem connected to the secured loan. The debtor company then applied for 
an examiner to be appointed. Following a High Court order, the examiner was appointed and the receiver 
ordered by the court to cease to act. The examinership process proceeded including the examiner 
availing of assets that had been subject to the charges imposed by AIB and the company was rescued. 
In addition, interim rescue financing was given priority in repayment under the examinership, which 
aligns with Article 17 of the PRD. The examinership rescue was successful with the company having 
recently (2015) been sold to a Canadian conglomerate. Holidair is an excellent example of how the 
secured creditors rights were affected from the outset and compromised all through the preventive 
restructuring process. 
3.4 Pursuing the Compromise and Approving the Cram Down 
3.4.1 Should Absolute Priority be Respected? The Irish Context 
A second question relates to how the accepted priority system can be compromised during the rescue. 
The question is to what extent the legislative framework providing for rescue will permit derogation 
from accepted priorities and furthermore how this is achieved. On her Oxford Law Blog, Anne Mennens 
concludes that:  
[T]he final text of the Restructuring Directive contains an APR with somewhat softer edges, 
allowing for derogations from the priority rules when (i) necessary to achieve the aims of the 
restructuring plan and (ii) such derogations do not unfairly prejudice the rights or interests of any 
affected parties.61 
She continues on to observe that it is accepted that ‘at a fairly late stage of the legislative process, in 
addition to the APR a “relative priority rule” (RPR) was introduced. This standard was advocated by 
the CODIRE research group62 in their final report published July 2018.’63 The introduction of the 
European version of relative priority has, however, been criticised and treated reluctantly by a number 
of European academics and commentators.64 Mennens does not support the introduction of the European 
RPR, stating that the:  
RPR enables the redistribution of value, allowing for the reshuffling and curtailing of pre-existing 
rights in a manner that is unpredictable. This is incompatible with the desire to create legal 
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certainty for investors. This uncertainty will hamper the free flow of capital, thereby undermining 
the Commission’s pursuit of a true capital markets union.65 
However, although Member States are free to opt for the APR or RPR, there is also a general derogation 
that in fact mirrors the Irish legislation:  
Member States may maintain or introduce provisions derogating from the first subparagraph 
where they are necessary in order to achieve the aims of the restructuring plan and where the 
restructuring plan does not unfairly prejudice the rights or interests of any affected parties 
(emphasis added).66 
This derogation essentially introduces an ‘unfair prejudice test’, which has long been a fixture of the 
Irish court’s fairness interpretations in relation to examinership rescue plans. The Irish examinership 
process requires that before a compromise is approved that includes a cross-class cram-down, there must 
be consent from at least one class of impaired creditors; that the court is satisfied that the compromise 
is equitable as regards any class of members or creditors that have not accepted the proposals; and that 
the scheme does not unfairly prejudice any creditor interests.67 An application of this test by the Irish 
Supreme Court in McInerney68 in which the Supreme Court approved the High Court’s refusal to 
approve the compromise is instructive: 69 
In essence, the issue on the confirmation hearing was whether the proposal was unfairly 
prejudicial to the banks. In this regard the judge adopted a test with which the parties agreed. He 
considered (at para. 4.3) that ‘it would require exceptional circumstances before a court could 
approve a scheme of arrangement where secured creditors could be shown to be worse off under 
the scheme than under the alternative methods by which the value of the secured creditors’ 
security could be realised.’70 
 The court continued:  
The judge pointed out that under this proposal, as under many if not all examinership proposals, 
the unsecured creditors would be paid an amount which was calculated as being more than that 
which they would receive under a liquidation. He suggested that if such a proposal nevertheless 
required that another class of creditors (in this case the secured creditors) receive something less 
than they would receive under receivership or liquidation, then that would by itself be a reason to 
conclude that there was unfair prejudice to the creditors, unless the disparity was justified by 
strong reasons. This approach was not contested on this appeal.71 
Applying this approach, the compromise was not approved on the basis that it unfairly prejudiced a 
class of impaired creditors. 
In contrast, in the Irish decision of SIAC72 the High Court and the Supreme Court approved the scheme 
despite objections from a Polish creditor and others that they were being unfairly prejudiced. Fennelly 
J, delivering the judgement of the Supreme Court, stated at para 71:  
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I would also approve the following helpful passage in Corporate Insolvency and Rescue, by Irene 
Lynch Fannon and Gerard Nicholas Murphy (2nd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2012) at 
paragraph 13.43: ‘While the court can take into account the prejudice an individual may suffer if 
the scheme is implemented, the prejudice must be unfair; the court will also consider the prejudice 
that will be caused to other creditors and employees if the scheme is not approved by the court 
and weigh both considerations in the balance when deciding whether or not to confirm the scheme 
of arrangement.’73 
The judgement continues at para 72: 
The court will need to assess any claim of a creditor to be unfairly prejudiced by proposals from 
all angles. There will be a wide range of potentially relevant elements in the factual circumstances 
of the company, some affecting the creditor adversely and some favourably. As can be seen from 
the cases, a court will take note of the fact that some creditors, while losing heavily in the write-
down of their debts, are likely to benefit if the company is able to resume trading. A party may 
claim to be prejudiced by the loss of an advantage, right or benefit. On the other hand, it may be 
relevant to note that the same party is in a position to retain a right or benefit which is not available 
to other creditors.74 
What can be drawn from these examples is that while an effective rescue process might begin from an 
absolute priority position, deviations are common and the tests available and applied by the courts help 
to prevent creditors from being treated unfairly, and are considered against the backdrop of priority 
rules. It could be said that the Irish system reflects the fact that in approving restructuring, judges are 
able to look at the circumstances on a case-by-case basis and determine, based on argument, evidence 
and precedent whether or not the plan devised is appropriate under the circumstances, allowing for 
ultimate flexibility in negotiation and, arguably, a greater likelihood of efficient restructuring success.  
3.3.2 Absolute Priority in the English Context 
The UK Scheme of Arrangement,75 another often successful restructuring procedure often utilised by 
foreign companies due to relative ease of access to the English courts, also utilises a similar test to 
ensure fairness for creditors whose rights have been affected by a restructuring plan. The scheme of 
arrangement, as set out in Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006, does not provide for a cross-class cram-
down, however, the courts have approved schemes where votes have not been given to ‘out-of-the-
money’ creditors.76 The lack of statutory cross-class cram-down in the UK has been a topic of interest 
for some time. 
Payne, for example, concedes that in order for a cram-down to be universally accepted, it needs to 
include protection for creditors.77 In relation to a proposed restructuring plan78 mooted in 2016, Payne 
noted that the UK government’s proposals for reform reflect a similar framework to the current scheme 
of arrangement, along with the requisite high level of confirmation thresholds (75% by value), although 
also including a cross-class cram-down including the same high thresholds. While this approach was 
criticised, the UK Government went on to propose that ‘at least one class of impaired creditors will need 
to vote in favour of the scheme and the absolute priority rule must be followed’.79 Although semantically 
embracing absolute priority in its proposal, the Government went on to immediately allow for deviations 
from it:  
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The Government’s proposals …[allow] the court to confirm a restructuring plan even if it does 
not comply with the absolute priority rule where that non-compliance is (i) necessary to achieve 
the aims of the restructuring and (ii) just and equitable in the circumstances (para 5.164).80  
Clearly even at this early stage in propsals for reform, the Government and those involved in developing 
the proposals for a new restructruing plan that would include a cross-class cram-down recognised that 
absolute priority should only ever be a starting point against which negotiations can be commenced. 
Payne surmised that these reform proposals were likely driven at least in part by a need to keep pace 
with changes happening in insolvency and restructuring in the rest of the world, including in particular 
what is now the Preventive Restructuring Directive, which at the time of Payne’s blog was in proposal 
form.81  
Since the time of the presentation to which this paper relates in September 2019, much has changed in 
the world and in the restructuring and insolvency industry as a result of the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic.82 The changes mooted in the 2016 consultation in the UK and the response that followed83 
has been largely superseded by rapidly passed legislation, although the results align fairly closely to the 
changes intended following that consultation process.84 A new restructuring plan that aligns in many 
respects to the PRD has been introduced, including a cross-class cram-down. It is a debtor in possession 
procedure aimed to help financially distressed companies (their companies or shareholders) to propose 
a plan to rescue the company (or one or more of its businesses), facilitating ‘complex debt arrangements 
to be restructured and support the injection of new rescue finance.’85 While there is a cross-class cram-
down, its approval by the court is contingent on a finding that it is ‘fair and equitable’ with the court 
satisfied that dissenting creditors would be no worse off in an alternative procedure.86 There is no 
explicit reference to adherence to any type of priority rule in the legislation, though it does offer a 
sweeping up provision that states a plan may be confirmed ‘if the court is prepared to sanction a 
Restructuring Plan’.87  
It is not yet clear whether the new plan will be internationally recognised in similar fashion to the classic 
scheme of arrangement – it is similarly included in company law rather than insolvency law and will 
become Part 26A in the Companies Act 2006, therefore it is likely to be similarly covered by the 
Judgments Regulation, although this position may also change post-Brexit as like the EIR Recast, the 
Judgments Regulation may also no longer apply. Payne in particular notes the potential significant 
impact that Brexit may have on the popularity of the UK as a restructuring destination: ‘In light of Brexit 
it is important that the UK does not fall behind in the area of restructuring.’ It is therefore not surprising 
that the new restructuring plan introduces a far more robust framework than was previously set out 
under Part 26, and the lack of explicit priority rules will likely mean greater flexibility for free 
negotiation and agreement contingent on court confirmation and approval. However, as noted by 
Jennifer Marshall in Brussels in June 2019, a the impact of Brexit may make English courts hesitant to 
sanction a foreign company to utilise the scheme of arrangement, and likely by extension the new 
restructuring plan. There are complicated reasons why establishing jurisdiction may become 
problematic, but it is sufficient to note that in the event of a ‘hard Brexit’ the certainty of recognition 
and enforcement will be lost, as a result of which a court may exercise its discretion and choose not to 
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The JCOERE Research has revealed much about the difficulties of having an identical collective 
understanding of similar terms and concepts associated with restructuring processes. The Irish 
experience with its robust preventive restructuring procedure, Examinership, and to a lesser extent the 
English experience with the scheme of arrangement as a less robust, but highly popular procedure, has 
helped to highlight these disconnects. This Chapter has explored two areas of particular interest and 
potential conflict that could eventually arise between competing restructuring procedures, namely, the 
issue of thresholds at which a restructuring process should be available as well as the use of a viability 
test by courts to assess restructuring plans. In addition, this chapter has examined how the rights of 
creditors are protected or may be protected under new procedures implemented under the PRD. It has 
been highlighted that there is a clear disconnect between the understanding of ‘absolute priority’ in the 
United States compared to the rules introduced under Article 11 of the PRD, and that this has created 
confusion and conflict in the insolvency academy in Europe which tends to further muddy the practical 
reality, which is that in order for a restructuring procedure to be widely successful, it must be permitted 
to negotiate within the priority waterfall, which includes habitually deviating from the rule that senior 
creditors should be repaid in full before any junior creditors receive anything. The Irish Examinership 
procedure adopts this flexible approach including a ‘best interest of creditors test’ and ‘the unfair 
prejudice test, which has been used to good effect since the procedure was introduced in 1990.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that the English system has introduced a new restructuring plan procedure 
which is clearly intended to be a robust procedure that reflects most of the PRD framework, but it does 
not specifically refer to any of the priority rules set out in the PRD. Rather it requires that the approval 
of the court and that dissenting creditors would be no worse off in an alternative scenario, clearly 
reflecting a ‘best interests of creditors’ test similar to the Irish approach. Whether Brexit will affect the 
popularity of the English scheme, or indeed see greater numbers of companies flock to Ireland for its 
well-developed Examinership process is yet to be seen. It is sufficient to conclude, however, that the 
EU Member States could do well to have regard to those jurisdictions experienced in restructuring when 
implementing frameworks under the PRD taking a more pragmatic and practical approach that has 
served Ireland and the UK well in the insolvency and restructuring industries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
